About The War

The Cold War turned hot for the first time in the Korean peninsula in the mid-1950s. Michael Hickey provides an overview of the so-called 'forgotten war'.

Introduction
 
At the mid-point of a century that had already seen two appallingly destructive and costly global conflicts, a savage war broke out in a remote country at the extremity of the Asian landmass. During the world war of 1939-45, the future of the Japanese empire was decided at Allied summit meetings. In the short term, pending the return of Korean independence, Korea, a Japanese colony since 1910, was to be occupied north of the 38th parallel by Soviet Russia. To the south, a United States military administration under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur would control the area from its headquarters in Tokyo.

In the North, the Soviets backed a Stalinist regime under their client Kim Il-sung and created the North Korean Peoples' Army, equipped with Russian tanks and artillery. In the South, the chaotic political situation resulted in an American-backed administration under the presidency of Syngman Rhee, whose openly declared aim was the imposition of national unity by force. As a result of this stance, the American-trained South Korean army was limited to a lightly armed gendarmerie, lacking tanks, combat aircraft and all but a small amount of field artillery.
'The North Koreans advanced rapidly south, aiming to take the vital port of Pusan.'
After several years of increasingly bloody frontier incidents along the 38th parallel, the Republic of Korea was invaded by the North Korean Peoples' Army on 25 June 1950. Despite earlier indications, the Pentagon was caught off-guard. As the North Koreans swept south, overwhelming all opposition, the US called on the Security Council to invoke the United Nations Charter and brand the North Koreans as aggressors. This was done and member states were called on to send in military assistance. The first American troops were then sent in to stiffen resistance against the invader. The British government responded at once and elements of the Far East Fleet were soon in action along the Korean coast, together with ships of Commonwealth navies.
However, the North Koreans still advanced rapidly south, aiming to take the vital port of Pusan. The American troops hurriedly sent from occupation duties in Japan fared badly against superior North Korean troops, but General Walton Walker, commanding the 8th United States Army in Korea (EUSAK), rallied his forces and held the Pusan bridgehead as reinforcements began to arrive. These reinforcements included two British battalions from Hong Kong, the Middlesex and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and an Australian battalion from Japan. Furthermore, a strong brigade group was mobilised in England and several thousand reservists were recalled to active duty. The 29th Brigade set sail in October 1950, reaching Korea a month later just as it seemed that the war was over.

China's Intervention

In mid-September, General MacArthur brought off a masterstroke by landing two divisions 240km (150 miles) in the enemy rear at the port of Inchon. Their communications cut, and under heavy aerial bombardment, the North Koreans broke and fled back north; MacArthur ordered a hot pursuit which led across the 38th parallel and deep into North Korea. As the victorious UN forces drew near to the Manchurian border, there were ominous signals from Peking that communist China would intervene to defend its territory. In mid-October, MacArthur met President Harry Truman on Wake Island in their first encounter to assure him that a massive UN offensive was about to conclude the war victoriously by Christmas. No sooner had this been launched in November than the Chinese unleashed their armies.
'...there were ominous signals from Peking that communist China would intervene to defend its territory.'
The UN forces recoiled in disorder and, by the new year, were defending a line well to the south of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Morale was low but the new field commander, General Ridgway, revived his heterogeneous command and advanced slowly north in the spring of 1951. By mid-April, the allies were back in the area of the 38th parallel when the Chinese launched their spring offensive. The British 29th Brigade narrowly escaped annihilation on the Imjin river as the 27th Commonwealth brigade on the central front beat off savage Chinese attacks. The UN line held, then moved north again. This time, there was no reckless advance into the north. The line stabilised in the general area of the 38th parallel and the remaining two years of fighting consisted of near-static operations as both sides fought from heavily fortified positions, using artillery, mines and wire to deny the enemy access to strategically important ground.
Throughout the war, air power was decisive. The North Korean air force was driven from the skies by US Air Force, Navy and Marines, using their superior equipment and training. Heavy bombers razed the cities and industrial plants of North Korea. Continuous attacks on the transport system forced the Chinese to rely on the packhorse for much of their logistical support. A new phase of air war opened when American B-29 bombers and their fighter escorts were challenged by Russian-built MiG-15 fighters flown by Chinese airmen. The MiG-15's outflew first-generation American jet fighters until the introduction of the swept-wing F-86 Sabre tipped the balance. In the world's first supersonic air combats, the Americans prevailed.

Stalemate

The allies achieved total naval supremacy when the North Korean navy's torpedo boats were blown out of the water by UN firepower. For the rest of the war, American, British, Commonwealth and other allied ships maintained a tight blockade on North Korea. In addition, naval aviation played a leading role in air support of the army on the ground.
'In July 1953, a great calm descended over the battlefields...'
In mid-1951, with the land battle in stalemate, both sides agreed to go to the conference table and armistice talks began. They dragged on for two years. The main haggling point was the future of the tens of thousands of communist prisoners held in camps on Koje Island off the coast of South Korea. While the communist negotiators were adamant that all were to be returned to their country of origin, thousands of prisoners were unwilling to be repatriated. There were several great mutinies in the Koje camps before a satisfactory formula enabled those who wished to be repatriated to go home and for asylum to be granted to those who wished otherwise. In July 1953, a great calm descended over the battlefields and in Operation Big Switch, thousands of former prisoners on each side were returned. A Demilitarised Zone or DMZ was established on the border. Both sides withdrew from their fighting positions, and a UN commission was set up to supervise the armistice.
Some 100,000 British servicemen and women served in the Japan-Korea theatre during the war. In July 1951, with the arrival of the strong Canadian brigade, the British, Australian, New Zealand and Indian units were formed into the 1st Commonwealth Division, which soon gained an enviable reputation among its allies.

The aftermath

No one knows exactly how many people died in this war. In a sense it was a civil war fought out with foreign participation on both sides. It was the first military test of the United Nations and also the last martial adventure of the old Commonwealth. The American Department of Defence acknowledges that almost 40,000 of its servicemen died, either in battle or of other causes. British casualties were 1,078 killed in action, 2,674 wounded and 1,060 missing or taken prisoner.
'It was the first military test of the United Nations and also the last martial adventure of the old Commonwealth.'
The true casualty figures for the North and South Koreans and Chinese will never be known. It is estimated that some 46,000 South Korean soldiers were killed and over 100,000 wounded. The Chinese are estimated by the Pentagon as having lost over 400,000 killed (including Mao Tse-tung's son) and 486,000 wounded, with over 21,000 captured. The North Koreans lost about 215,000 killed, 303,000 wounded and over 101,000 captured or missing.
British veterans of the campaign were left with abiding memories of a South Korea which had been deprived of its dignity, fought over and ruined, its demoralised population brought to beggary and its infrastructure destroyed. Since 1953, the Republic of Korea has transformed into a modern state. In the North, however, the Stalinist regime created by Kim Il-sung is only now beginning to move out of its hermit state. The economy is in ruins and famine stalks the land. It is too early to say if the tentative moves towards reconciliation will result in attainment of the unity so deeply desired by many Koreans.

Denis Whybro, British tank commander in Korea
 
Corporal Derek Hirst of the Royal Army Medical Corps in Korea

Britains Involvment

Almost 100,000 British troops fought in Korea 50 years ago in conflict as bloody as any seen before or since. Yet many veterans still consider it the war our country has forgotten. Fifty years ago 600 soldiers of the British Army took on a force of 30,000 Chinese troops crossing the Imjin River in Korea. Reporting to his American superior, Brigadier Tom Brodie of the Gloucestershire Regiment admitted the situation was "a bit sticky". Such classic British understatement failed to secure the "Glorious Glosters" reinforcements or permission to fall back. At the end of the battle 10,000 Chinese troops had fallen. British losses stood at just 59, but only 39 of the survivors evaded capture. Two Victoria Crosses, Britain's highest military honour, were awarded for the action. But despite such heroism, Britain's role in the conflict has largely been forgotten by the public. What caused the war? When the Japanese forces occupying Korea were defeated in 1945, the country was "temporarily" split at the 38th Parallel - with US troops liberating the south and the Russians moving into the north. Cold War wranglings postponed the re-unification of the country. On 25 June 1950, soldiers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea launched an attack on their neighbours to the south. The United Nations Security Council (led by the US and in Russia's absence) passed a resolution to begin a "police action" to help the south. Why did Britain join the conflict? In 1950, the UK was still licking the wounds of World War II. The British Empire was in sharp decline and Clement Attlee's government (with a Commons majority of just five) was facing its own military woes in Malaya. When Korea was first divided in 1945, the Labour cabinet suspected it might one day be forced to dispatch combat troops there, something it viewed as a "most undesirable commitment". However, the UK was a full member of the Security Council, somewhat indebted to the US and still adjusting to its reduced global importance. Reminded by a colleague that Korea was not a priority interest for Britain, Clement Attlee mused: "Distant, yes, but nonetheless an obligation." How many British troops fought? More than 90,000 Britons served in Korea, among them Fusilier Maurice Micklewhite (better known as Sir Michael Caine) and Captain Anthony Farrar-Hockley (who was promoted to general and later commanded Nato). Due to cutbacks and difficulties recruiting regular troops, a large number of those sent to Korea were National Service conscripts. Which other countries were represented? The United States provided the bulk of the United Nations force. However, countries as diverse as France, Cuba, South Africa, Ethiopia, Belgium Thailand, Australia, Turkey, Canada and Bolivia also contributed men and materials. Forces from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were bolstered by "volunteers" from China. How was the campaign fought? At times the war bore all the hallmarks of the Nazi blitzkrieg, with both sides staging massive, fast-moving offensives which swept aside the opposition. At other times, the fighting was reminiscent of the battles of attrition seen in World War I. By 1952, the sides had fought each other to a standstill and were prepared to re-establish the 38th Parallel as the border between the Koreas. Was this the war's end? The nature of the war resulted in many thousands of troops from both sides being taken prisoner. The Geneva Convention rules on repatriation had not envisaged a conflict like Korea, causing PoWs to become a major sticking point in securing peace. One in three Chinese prisoners claimed not to be keen to return home, forcing the UN to consider whether to agree to China's calls for forced repatriation. It took until 27 July 1953 to agree a compromise and for the armistice to be signed. What about British prisoners of war? More than 1,000 British servicemen fell into enemy hands. Many were subjected to brutal treatment and "political re-education". Some 82 prisoners never returned home and are presumed dead. Royal Marine Andrew Condron chose to settle in China, only returning to the UK in 1960. What was the human cost of the war? The losses experienced by Britain (1,078) and the United States (37,000) are dwarfed by China's and North Korea's military fatalities, which number perhaps 1.5 million. Civilian and military losses in South Korea also exceeded one million. The Koreas remain divided to this day, with not only a country, but countless families kept apart by the fortifications of the 38th Parallel. The Korean War revealed the limits of the "special relationship" between the UK and the US. The Attlee and Churchill governments found it almost impossible to influence America's execution of the war.   A Korea veteran helps the brother of a British victim at a ceremony to mark the annivesary

A Korea veteran helps the brother of a British victim at a ceremony to mark the annivesary

Untold Massacres

In September 1999 an investigative team from the Associated Press broke a story that shocked America. Fifty years before, they claimed, refugees caught up in the Korean War were shot and strafed by US forces. Jeremy Williams explores the repercussions of a brutal episode in Cold War history.

The Forgotten War

The Korean War was a bloody conflict. It left Korea, North and South, with several million dead and the UN forces involved in the fighting with over 100,000 casualties. But despite fighting as intense and as violent as any other conflict since World War Two, Korea has always been history's 'Forgotten War'.
'...US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield.'
While atrocities conducted both by North and South Korean forces have already been documented, recently a much darker side to the US involvement in the Korean War has begun to emerge. It casts a shadow over the conduct of US forces during the conflict, particularly of officers and generals in command. Declassified military documents recently found in the US National Archives show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield. More disturbing still have been the published testimonies of Korean survivors who recall such killings, and the frank accounts of those American veterans brave enough to admit involvement.
The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when communist North Korea invaded the South with six army divisions. These North Korean forces, backed by impressive Soviet equipment including tanks, made quick gains into the territory. The United States decided to intervene in the defence of the South and, taking advantage of the Soviet absence from the UN Security Council, proceeded to press for UN resolutions condemning the invasion. Days later a resolution was passed calling upon member countries to give assistance to South Korea to repulse the attack. General Douglas MacArthur, then in charge of US forces in the Pacific and of the occupation of Japan, was appointed commander of the joint forces.
Things began to go wrong almost immediately for the American troops. Those who were rushed to the front line straight from occupation duty in Tokyo in July 1950 were undertrained and underprepared. They were also badly led and quickly defeated by superior North Korean forces. US commanders were outmanoeuvred by North Korean units using guerrilla methods to target US lines from the rear.
But there was another problem. The surprise attack from the North had generated a very real refugee crisis. Just weeks after the conflict had begun, up to two million refugees were streaming across the battlefield; they clogged the roads and the UN lines.
Under pressure and fearing North Korean infiltration, the US leadership panicked. Soon command saw all civilians as the enemy regardless. On 26 July the US 8th Army, the highest level of command in Korea, issued orders to stop all Korean civilians. 'No, repeat, no refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time. Movement of all Koreans in group will cease immediately.' On the very same day the first major disaster involving civilians struck.
'...up to 400 South Korean civilians gathered by the bridge were killed by US forces from the 7th Cavalry Regiment.'
The stone bridge near the village of No Gun Ri spans a small stream. It is similar to a great many others that cross the landscape of South Korea, except that the walls of this bridge were, until very recently, pockmarked by hundreds of bullet holes. On the very day that the US 8th Army delivered its stop refugee order in July 1950, up to 400 South Korean civilians gathered by the bridge were killed by US forces from the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Some were shot above the bridge, on the railroad tracks. Others were strafed by US planes. More were killed under the arches in an ordeal that local survivors say lasted for three days.
'The floor under the bridge was a mixture of gravel and sand. People clawed with their bare hands to make holes to hide in,' recalls survivor Yang Hae Chan. 'Other people piled up the dead like a barricade, and hid behind the bodies as a shield against the bullets.'
Corroborating the Korean survivors' testimony are the accounts of 35 veterans of the 7th Cavalry Regiment who recall events at No Gun Ri. Perspectives differ, but the detailed memories of veterans recalling events burnt into their souls by their first days in combat are as painful as they are shocking.
'There was a lieutenant screaming like a madman, fire on everything, kill 'em all,' recalls 7th Cavalry veteran Joe Jackman. 'I didn't know if they were soldiers or what. Kids, there was kids out there, it didn't matter what it was, eight to 80, blind, crippled or crazy, they shot 'em all.'
Along with the My Lai atrocity 20 years later in Vietnam, the killings discovered at No Gun Ri mark one of the largest single massacres of civilians by American forces in the 20th century. When the news of the killings at No Gun Ri was first broken by a team of investigative journalists from the Associated Press in September 1999, the effects were to be as seismic as the allegations themselves.
America was deeply shocked by the AP report. Previously, the US Army had dismissed the claims of South Korean survivors who, since 1960, had been trying to tell the truth about the killings at No Gun Ri. The Army said that US forces were not even in the area of No Gun Ri at the time of the killings. But not only did new evidence put No Gun Ri firmly within the US 7th Cavalry area of operations at the time, the discovery of US veterans willing to talk about events 50 years later made the massacre undeniable. The Clinton administration quickly directed that the Pentagon, specifically the Army, conduct an investigation into what actually happened at No Gun Ri.
'...as late as January 1951, the US 8th Army was detailing all units in Korea that refugees be attacked with all available fire including bombing.'
Since the original AP report, more documents detailing refugee 'kill' orders have been unearthed at the US national archives. They point to the widespread targeting of refugees by commanders well after No Gun Ri. In August 1950 there were orders detailing that refugees crossing the Naktong River be shot. Later in the same month, General Gay, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division (of which the 7th Cavalry Regiment involved at No Gun Ri was part), actually ordered artillery units to target civilians on the battlefield. And as late as January 1951, the US 8th Army was detailing all units in Korea that refugees be attacked with all available fire including bombing.
New allegations have also emerged of the indiscriminate killing of civilians in Korea. In August 1950, 80 civilians are reported to have been killed while seeking sanctuary in a shrine by the village of Kokaan-Ri, near Masan in South Korea. Other survivors recall 400 civilians killed by US naval artillery on the beaches near the port of Pohang in September 1950, and dozens of villages across southern South Korea report the repeated low-level strafing by US planes of 'people in white' during July and August 1950. A total of 61 separate incidents involving the killing of civilians by US forces are now logged with the South Korean authorities.
The Pentagon inquiry into No Gun Ri was finally released in January 2001. The basis of its conclusions are doubtful. The investigation acknowledged the killing of civilians at No Gun Ri by US forces, but it concluded that the killings that took place there were not deliberate attacks but 'an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war'.
'...clear orders had been given by command not to let refugees through the lines.'
Yet whatever the confusion on the battlefield at the time, clear orders had been given by command not to let refugees through the lines. More importantly, documents showed orders had actually been received by the 8th Cavalry Regiment, sister to the 7th Cavalry involved at No Gun Ri. 'No refugees to cross the line. Fire everyone trying to cross the lines. Use discretion in the case of women and children.' This was an order from the headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division.
More documents were discovered that showed that the Air Force was strafing civilians at the request of the Army. Air Force Colonel Turner Rogers wrote a memo the day before events at No Gun Ri. 'The Army has requested we strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted approaching our positions,' the memo read. It went on to confirm the instructions had been acted upon. 'To date, we have complied with the army request in this respect.'
Despite this the Pentagon maintains in the report that no orders were issued to shoot refugees at No Gun Ri. This rather narrow frame of reference effectively ignores whatever evidence there might be of other orders given at the time to treat civilians as the enemy. Only orders specifically mentioning No Gun Ri would qualify. Even so this is a surprising conclusion to draw for a number of other reasons.
'...a significant number of the veterans interviewed did in fact recall orders to open fire on the civilians at No Gun Ri.'
Firstly, the oral testimony given by veterans of the 7th Cavalry to the Pentagon during its 14-month investigation may contradict the Pentagon's position. This evidence has never been made fully public, but what has been discovered by those allowed access to the material, is that a significant number of the veterans interviewed did in fact recall orders to open fire on the civilians at No Gun Ri.
Secondly, the 7th Cavalry communications log - the log that might have contained evidence of such orders had they been given - has gone missing. The significance of this is highlighted by Charles Hanley, one of the AP journalists who first investigated No Gun Ri. '[The Pentagon] report declares that there were no orders at No Gun Ri - and it declares that flatly - but it doesn't have the document that would prove that one way or the other.'
The inconsistencies that surround the Pentagon's investigation have even led those brought in as independent advisors to voice doubts. Pete McCloskey, a decorated Korean War veteran and former Congressman, was brought in to advise on the Pentagon report. He was disappointed with what was finally published. 'I think the American government, the Pentagon and most government agencies don't want to see the truth come out if it will embarrass the government.
'I think the American government, the Pentagon and most government agencies don't want to see the truth come out if it will embarrass the government.'
'I think it's almost a rule of political science. The government will always lie about embarrassing matters. And when you are up in the Pentagon a full Colonel and have a chance to make General, and General with the chance to become Chief of Staff, there's as much politics high in the Pentagon as there is in the halls of Congress. And I think that the Army just chose to try and down play the terrible character of Army leadership in 1950.'
It is now nearly 50 years since the end of the conflict in Korea. The only major American investigation into the killing of refugees focused exclusively on the activities of the US Army over a small geographic area during one month of a conflict that lasted three years. Contradicting testimony from veterans and Korean survivors, the report concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that orders to kill civilians were given at No Gun Ri. Clearly there are still many unanswered questions over American involvement in Korea, questions that were not answered by the narrow view of the US Army's investigation. Yet this burden now falls not on those responsible for giving the orders, but on the veterans and survivors alike.

By Michael Hickley
All Information Courtesy Of BBC
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_hickey_01.shtml